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At the 2005 general election in the U.K., held on 5 May, the Labour Party won 
an historically unprecedented third victory in a row, and, correspondingly, the 
Conservative Party suffered its third defeat in a row. In total, 62 seats changed hands, 
and as all three major parties experienced both some success and some failure, the 
election results were curiously ambivalent. The election, itself, was called one year 
before it was technically necessary to do so - the United Kingdom does not have fixed 
terms for Westminster elections (unlike other British elections at sub-national level). 
This is quite normal for an incumbent party – serving the full five-year term is often 
seen a sign of electoral weakness and whilst Labour was in some difficulty, waiting a 
further year would probably not have been sensible in electoral terms. The 
Conservatives also had difficulties. Since the resignation of John Major after the 1997 
electoral defeat, the party had had three different leaders with one, Iain Duncan-
Smith, not even lasting long enough to fight a general election. Nevertheless, poll 
ratings suggested that the party was closing the gap somewhat on Labour. Finally, the 
Liberal Democrats appeared to be on the rise, championing their opposition to 
unpopular government policies on the Iraq war and student fees.  
 
1.  Campaign strategies 
Discussion of election campaigns in Britain often distinguishes between the 
long and short campaigns, national and local campaigns, even the campaign before 
and after the closing date for postal votes.
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 In the 2005 election, the two campaigns 
were the national campaign, which was covered by the media, and the ‘real’ 
campaign, which targeted some 200-230 target constituencies. Moreover, in contrast 
to unfocussed national electioneering, the targeted constituency campaigns were 
centrally directed and highly focussed, with the central party organisations playing the 
more significant role. 
  
This ‘local’ strategy applied particularly to the Conservative and Labour 
campaigns, with both presenting national messages in a local context. For example, 
electioneering materials frequently presented policies in terms of their effects on local 
constituencies rather than the country as a whole. Both parties had large 
communication centres, with key voters in key seats being sent direct mail (some 
eight mailings by the Conservatives) and contacted by telephone. A particular 
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innovation was contacting voters via an automated phone system, enabling the parties 
to collect vote intention data quickly and cheaply. The Liberal Democrats’ campaign 
was notable for its ‘decapitation strategy’, targeting seats held by prominent 
Conservative MPs. 
 
This local strategy also applied to other aspects of the campaigns. Most 
billboard advertisements were positioned in and around target seats or on busy ’travel 
to work’ routes. Although all three major parties ran some national newspaper 
advertisements, greater emphasis was placed on advertising in the regional press, 
focussed mainly on target constituencies and adjusting the message for different 
audiences. Moreover, but hardly a new tactic, key party personnel toured only target 
seats. Other innovations included Labour’s distribution of DVDs to key voters in 
target constituencies and the Conservatives’ use of daily tracker polls in target seats.   
 
In all, the 2005 campaigns provided further evidence that constituency 
campaigning is being increasingly co-ordinated and managed by professionals from 
national party headquarters. This local targeting even went to the point of suggesting 
that local contests were seen, by the major parties, as more important than the national 
contest. This is further confirmation of the revisionist view (Denver et al. 2003) of the 
significance of local campaigning, but, importantly, nationally co-ordinated 
constituency campaigning was dominant, not locally organised campaigning. 
 
 
2. Campaign issues 
  Under the slogans ‘Forward Not Back’ and ‘Vision for a Third Term’, 
Labour’s national campaign concentrated on the economy, health, and education, 
issue areas in which it could claim to have performed well since 1979. Later in the 
campaign, fearing that abstention could damage its vote, Labour also focused on 
boosting turnout. Despite the local targeting strategy, the analysis of constituency 
campaign leaflets (Fisher, 2005) reveals that law and order was the only major 
addition to the issues covered in Labour’s broader national campaign; notably, neither 
the Iraq war nor Europe featured large.   
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In the 2001 election campaign, to secure its core vote, the Conservatives had 
focussed on Europe and immigration/asylum. Its 2005 platform was much broader, 
concentrating on crime, tax, immigration, healthcare and clean hospitals, and school 
discipline; and, later in the campaign, pensions. Europe was conspicuously absent 
from the Conservatives’ frontline policies, but immigration was still prominent. The 
strategy appeared to be to attract floating voters who might be ‘Conservative-minded’. 
 
The immigration issue generated the most media attention. The Conservatives 
complained that the focus was excessive; that they were, in fact, campaigning on a 
wide range of issues, with immigration given no special prominence. Analysis of 
constituency election materials (Fisher 2005) suggests that the Conservatives’ 
complaints were justified: immigration featured less often in Conservative 
constituency leaflets than law and order, health, and education. Contrary to 
impressions, the party was not ‘always crashing in the same car’ by campaigning 
solely on immigration. It appealed on a broad front, but appears to have been 
hampered by the media’s focus on its immigration stance. 
 
The Liberal Democrats campaigned nationally on five principal issues: 
abolition of student tuition fees, free personal health care for the elderly, scrapping the 
Council Tax, the Iraq war, and the environment ─ all issues where polling suggested 
the party was ahead. The local campaign analysis presents a slightly different picture, 
however (Fisher, 2005). Like the two major parties, the Liberal Democrats at the local 
level placed a great deal of emphasis on law and order. And, like Labour, Europe was 
almost completely ignored.  
 
The contents of local campaign leaflets are also worth noting.
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 First, their tone 
varied, with Labour’s the most positive, the Conservative’s roughly evenly balanced 
between positive and negative, and the Liberal Democrat’s rather more positive than 
negative. Secondly, over 40% of the leaflets distributed by the Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats engaged in significant levels of personal attack on other 
politicians. Labour engaged in fewer personal attacks, but this may reflect 
campaigning differences between incumbents and challengers. Thirdly, all parties 
featured significant local messages in a majority of constituencies. However, the 
Conservatives were most given to promoting local concerns; the Liberal Democrats 
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the least. The marginality of constituencies also mattered; all three major parties, 
including Labour, campaigned more negatively in marginal seats. This was 
particularly true of the Liberal Democrats; in the vast majority of marginal seats, their 
leaflets featured personal attacks, many of them on the Prime Minister. Marginality 
also boosted the extent of local content in Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
constituency campaigns; for Labour there was no such pattern. 
 
Analysis of the local campaigns dispels three myths about the 2005 general 
election. One: the Conservative Party was concerned not only with immigration; it 
campaigned rather more on other issues. Two: whilst the Liberal Democrats have 
often presented themselves as more principled than Labour and the Conservatives, it 
engaged in personal attacks as much as the Conservatives and especially in marginal 
seats. Three: it was the Conservatives, not the Liberal Democrats, who campaigned 
most on local issues.  
 
3. Election results 
The results of the election are detailed in Table 1. Turnout at the election was 61.4% - 
2% higher than in 2001, but still historically low, being the second lowest turnout 
since 1918. 
 
    < Table 1 about here > 
 
 
On election night, Labour’s celebrations were distinctly muted, despite its 
comfortable overall majority (65 seats) and wining a third term. For a party whose 
electoral performance in post-war elections could be described as patchy at best, 
winning three full terms in a row was a considerable achievement. Moreover, 
Labour’s majority at the 2005 election looks the poorer because its majorities in 1997 
and 2001 were outstanding. Even so, there were downsides to Labour’s victory.  
 
First, based on the ‘notional’ 2001 results,4 Labour lost some 47 seats ─ and 
lost them to different parties: the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, and the Scottish 
National Party, as well as one-off defeats to the Respect party, and to an Independent 
candidate. Secondly, even where Labour held on to seats, majorities were reduced. 
There are now 88 Labour seats with a majority of less than 10%, compared with 61 
following the 2001 election. Hence, seats not targeted in 2005 because considered 
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safe will need to be targeted at the next election, thereby stretching resources. As 
Denver et al (2002) show, the electoral payoffs are smaller the larger the number of 
seats parties target. Thirdly, Labour’s overall national vote share fell significantly, 
from 40.7% in to 35.2%. This was a record low for a winning party, and meant that 
only 21.6% of the eligible electorate voted Labour (also a record for a winning party). 
Cautions about over-interpreting victories in U.K. elections have been made 
elsewhere (e.g., see Cowley et al., 1998), but bear in mind that even Labour’s 1997 
vote share was smaller than it had achieved in the five elections 1945-1966. 
Moreover, in 1997, Labour commanded only 30.8% of the support of the eligible 
electorate – a figure bettered by the Conservatives in three of their election victories 
1979-1992.   
 
The Conservative Party, despite its third defeat in a row, emerged with some 
cheer. They gained a reasonable number of seats (36), lost only one ‘big name’ 
(despite the Liberal Democrats’ ‘decapitation strategy’), and wrested seats from both 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats. They became the strongest party in England in 
terms of vote share (35.7%), gained seats in Scotland and Wales, and largely resisted 
electoral advances by the Liberal Democrats. Thus, talk of a serious Conservative 
challenge in the near future appears to have some credibility.  
 
From another perspective, the Conservative’s performance was unimpressive.  
In terms of vote share, the party’s improvement on 2001 was only 0.7%; in terms of 
seats, it bettered only its position in 1997 and 2001. Moreover, the party’s vote share 
fell in some regions (North East, North West, Yorkshire, Humberside, and East and 
West Midlands), suggesting the party is hardly revitalised in swathes of England. In 
short, the Conservative Party averted an electoral disaster and remains the major 
opposition party, but little more.      
 
The Liberal Democrats’ high hopes going into the election, largely due to 
Labour’s declining popularity and the Conservative’s weak recovery, also came to 
little. Its only real successes were winning 12 seats from Labour and three from the 
Conservatives. Otherwise, the Liberal Democrats share of the vote increased by a 
modest 3.7 percentage points; the Conservatives took five of their seats; and, where 
Conservatives held their seats, they frequently turned slim majorities into more 
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comfortable ones. Clearly, the ‘decapitation strategy’ was an abject failure; and 
neither the Liberal Democrats’ opposition to the Iraq war nor university fees seemed 
to draw significant support to it. Albeit that the Liberal Democrats emerged from the 
election with an additional 11 seats, the party failed to capitalise on the potential for 
greater advance. 
  
The national parties (Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National Party) 
experienced mixed fortunes. Overall, Plaid Cymru’s vote share fell by 1.7 percentage 
points in Wales; and it lost one seat to the Liberal Democrats (Ceredigion). The 
Scottish National Party also lost votes: 2.4 percentage points on its 2001 vote share – 
its poorest showing since 1987. But it won two seats from Labour, taking the SNP’s 
total to six (jointly with 1997, its best performance since its 1974  highpoint). 
 
There were also some successes for independent candidates and minor parties. 
The Independent Kidderminster Hospital Health Concern candidate retained the Wyre 
Forest seat won in 2001; the Independent candidate in Blaenau Gwent won the seat 
from Labour,
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 and the Respect candidate, former Labour MP, George Galloway, won 
the seat of Bethnal Green and Bow – also from Labour. The UK Independence Party 
put up some 496 candidates (up from 428 in 2001) and the British National Party 
some 119 (up from 33 in 2001). Where it had candidates standing, the British 
National Party polled on average 4.3%, the Greens 3.4%, and the UK Independence 
Party 2.8%. In all, the minor parties put in stronger performances than previously, 
suggesting they are likely to remain electoral players, especially whilst they continue 
to achieve some success in local, devolved, and European elections.  
 
In Northern Ireland, the emerging dominance of the Democratic Unionist 
Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein continued. The DUP gained four seats from the Ulster 
Unionist Party (UUP) giving it nine of the 18 Westminster seats in Northern Ireland. 
Sinn Fein gained one seat from the Social and Democratic Labour Party (SDLP), 
making it the second largest party with five seats. The SDLP gained one seat from the 
UUP. Thus, the UUP, once dominant in Northern Irish politics, was left with only one 
seat; even the UUP’s leader, David Trimble, lost his seat. This was the UUP’s worst 
ever general election performance, losing 9 percentage points of its Northern Irish 
vote in 2001. 
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4. Outcomes 
Labour’s third successive election victor, led to revived discussion, originating 
in the Conservative Party’s fourth electoral consecutive victory in 1992, that Britain 
had, in effect, become an elected ‘one-party state’ (eg. Margetts and Smyth, 1994). 
Regardless of whether this was justified, either now, or in 1992, the slim margin of 
Labour’s victory in terms of vote share has led to an increased focus on the electoral 
systems used for general elections 
 
 The vote:seats (dis)proportionality following several British general elections 
have given rise to demands for electoral reform. After the 2005 election, much 
attention focussed on the fact that only one in five of the electorate actually voted 
Labour ─ a mischievous argument, since the figure was depressed by low turnout. 
Advocates of electoral reform claim that the non-representativeness associated with 
the ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system is getting worse: ever fewer people support 
the winning party; the Effective Number of Electoral Parties and the Effective 
Number of Parliamentary Parties
6
 are rising, confirming the emergence of multi-party 
politics to which a first-past-the-post system is less well-suited.  
 
On the other hand, in terms of the electoral system’s performance, the 
outcome of the 2005 election was not very different from earlier elections. In fact, the 
DV score (which measures deviation from proportionality, in terms of the percentage 
share of votes and percentage share of seats) actually fell, with disproportionality 
barely different from 2001. Thus, the 2005 results are unlikely to add further 
ammunition to the reformers’ case: those who favoured reform before are likely to 
favour it still; for those who did not, there was little about the 2005 election to make 
for a change of mind. The key question is probably whether the Conservative Party 
will change its position, not through conversion to proportionality but simply self-
interest. The party flirted with electoral reform whilst out of power in the 1970s; 
perhaps three election defeats may lead it to consider reform once more.   
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Table 1 
Results of UK general election, 5 May 2005 
 
 
 
 Votes Vote 
Share 
(%) 
  Change in      
Vote Share           
(%)* 
Seats Change 
in Seats 
Conservative 8,784,915 32.4 +0.7 198 +33 
Labour 9,552,436 35.2 -5.5 355 -47 
Liberal Democrat 5,985,454 22.0 +3.7 62 +11 
Plaid Cymru 174,838 0.6 -0.1 3 -1 
Scottish Nationalist Party 412,267 1.5 -0.3 6 +2 
UK Independence Party 605,973 2.2 +0.7 0 0 
Green 283,414 1.0 +0.4 0 0 
British National Party 192,745 0.7 +0.5 0 0 
Democratic Unionist Party 241,856 0.9 +0.2 9 +4 
Sinn Fein 174,530 0.6 -0.1 5 +1 
Ulster Unionist Party 127,414 0.5 -0.3 1 -5 
Social Democratic & 
Labour Party  
125,626 0.5 -0.1 3 0 
Others/Speaker 487,042 1.8 -0.1 4 +2 
Total 27,148,510 100.0  646  
 
Source: Election 2005: Turnout (Electoral Commission, 2005) 
 
Notes:  Table includes results for the South Staffordshire constituency, postponed to 
23rd June following the death of a candidate. Labour and the Liberal Democrats only 
contest seats in Great Britain (England, Scotland, and Wales); Plaid Cymru only 
contests seats in Wales; the Scottish Nationalist Party only contests seats in Scotland; 
the Democratic Unionist Party, Sinn Fein, Ulster Unionist Party, and Social 
Democratic and Labour Party only contest seats in Northern Ireland.  
* Notional scores; see Footnote 4.   
 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1
  I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Philip Cowley and Colin Rallings in 
gathering together some of the information in this note. 
2  Postal voting on demand was introduced prior to the 2001 General Election. 
3
 For a detailed analysis of constituency-level campaign literature, see Fisher 2005. 
 
4
 One effect of Scottish devolution was a reduction in the number of Westminster 
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seats in Scotland from 72 to 59. Hence, calculations about seat losses and gains as 
they relate to Scotland, and thus Great Britain, are based on ‘notional’ results for 
the 2001 election; that is, calculated  as if the 2001 election was fought on the basis of 
the 646 constituencies contested in 2005 rather than the 659 contested in 2001.  
See, for example, General Election 2005, House of Commons Research Paper 05/33 
5
 The candidate was a former Labour member of the Welsh Assembly who stood in 
protest at the decision of the Labour Party to impose an all-women candidate shortlist 
to succeed the retiring MP. 
6
 The ENEP Index was 2.46 in 1970, rising to 3.47 in 2005 ─ its highest in the post-
1945 period. The 2005 ENPP score was 2.44 – again, post-war high. 
